CTI-to-detection practitioner. Threat Intelligence Research Engineer.
CTI-to-detection practitioner. Threat Intelligence Research Engineer.
+972-542-553-383 · 1200km@gmail.com · linkedin.com/in/andrey-pautov · github.com/anpa1200 · medium.com/@1200km
CTI-to-detection analyst with 3+ years across government cyber defence (Israel Police Cyber Defence Unit) and commercial security engineering (XPLG). Profiles adversary infrastructure, reconstructs kill chains, and maps TTPs to ATT&CK-aligned detection candidates. Builds tooling to automate the mechanical parts of CTI triage, malware analysis, and cloud attack simulation.
Shipped 10+ open-source tools: AIDebug (Capstone + FLIRT + CFG + Frida + INetSim, 8 behavioral pattern detectors, SIEM-ready JSON output), stratus-ai (9 AWS + 7 GCP attack simulation modules, 125-test suite, ECS Fargate / Cloud Run), cvss_4.0 (CVSS-BTE + CISA KEV + EPSS, 6 asset-context profiles), and supporting malware, cloud, and CTI tooling. Published 150+ articles and 8 Docusaurus field guides on CTI tradecraft, detection engineering, malware analysis, and cloud security.
XPLG — Enterprise Security Data Platform · Tel Aviv, Israel
Israel Police — יחידת הגנת הסייבר · Jerusalem, On-site
Self-employed · Israel, Remote
| MuddyWater / Seedworm | Evidence-labeled actor assessment. 14 ATT&CK TTPs mapped (T1053.005, T1059.005, T1071.001, T1090.001, T1497.003, T1566.001, T1574.002 + 7 more). 7 malware samples analyzed (MD5: 7415d6ba…, SHA256: b154d3fd…). Detection candidates per kill chain stage. |
| Israel Gov. Threat Actors CTI | Public-source sector CTI: 10+ actor profiles. Handala cluster: 22+ confirmed hashes (MD5: 1476f9f4…, SHA256: 3c9dc8ad…), T1003.001, T1505.003, T1567.002, T1585.001 mapped. ASN reuse → passive DNS → crt.sh → 14 additional hosts confirmed. |
| CTI Analyst Field Manual | Docusaurus tradecraft reference: evidence labeling, source reliability, confidence tiering, attribution methodology, infrastructure pivoting, ATT&CK candidate mapping, hunting hypotheses. |
| AIDebug | Malware RE walker: Capstone, FLIRT, CFG, Frida, INetSim, 8 behavioral pattern detectors, SIEM-ready JSON. Real sample: Authenticator.exe (DearStealer) — MD5: c6ab7265…, T1056.001, T1547.001, T1555.003, T1573.001 mapped. |
| stratus-ai | Cloud attack simulation platform: 9 AWS + 7 GCP modules (CloudTrail evasion, privilege escalation, lateral movement, data exfil), 125-test suite, ECS Fargate / Cloud Run deployment. |
| OpenCTI Intelligent Shield | CTI platform engineering: connector design, STIX 2.1 object workflows, enrichment source confidence management, feed integration, and analyst gate logic. |
| cvss_4.0 | CVSS 4.0 enrichment tool: CVSS-BTE scoring, CISA KEV lookup, EPSS probability, 6 asset-context profiles. Context delta example: base 9.8 → 6.2 after OT profile + KEV absence. |
| PE-Import-Analyzer | LIEF-based Windows PE import triage: classifies APIs by risk class (CRITICAL / SUSPICIOUS / UNCOMMON), flags injection-pattern sequences, outputs structured JSON for analyst or LLM ingestion. |
| Operation DragonRx Lab | APT41 pharmaceutical-sector attack simulation lab. Log4Shell initial access (CVE-2021-44228) → Sliver C2 → Active Directory lateral movement → LSASS dump. Dual-layer detection: Wazuh + Zeek + Elastic. Published lab architecture and full attack playbook. |
| Vulnerable Infrastructure Labs | 10+ purpose-built attack labs: GCP + AWS Terraform environments (vulnerable-cloud-lab), 25-misconfiguration Kubernetes lab, IIS/SharePoint/Fluent Bit lab, vulnerable Windows 10 + Active Directory domain, Ubuntu 24.04 lab, DVWA (Ansible-automated), deliberately vulnerable Android app (all OWASP Mobile Top 10), Vulnerable AI Lab (RAG/LLM attack surfaces). |