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AshTag

This is a defensive tool-intelligence page. It is intended for analyst navigation, source review, and hunt planning. It is not a malware-analysis report and does not contain sample code or binaries.

Summary

  • Associated actor(s): WIRTE
  • Tool type(s): Modular .NET malware suite
  • Confidence level(s): High
  • Source ID(s): SRC-UNIT42-ASHTAG-2025

Behavior

ActorBehavior Summary
WIRTEUnit 42 reports AshTag as a WIRTE/Ashen Lepus modular .NET malware suite with AshenLoader, AshenStager, AshenOrchestrator, and modules; behavior includes DLL side-loading, HTML tag payload retrieval, AES/XOR-protected staging, modular collection, and Rclone exfiltration.

Hash And IOC Status

ActorStatusReference
WIRTERepresentative Unit 42 SHA256s include f554c43707f5d87625a3834116a2d22f551b1d9a5aff1e446d24893975c431bc, 739a5199add1d970ba22d69cc10b4c3a13b72136be6d45212429e8f0969af3dc, 6bd3d05aef89cd03d6b49b20716775fe92f0cf8a3c2747094404ef98f96e9376, 30490ba95c42cefcca1d0328ea740e61c26eaf606a98f68d26c4a519ce918c99, and 66ab29d2d62548faeaeadaad9dd62818163175872703fda328bb1b4894f5e69e; use full Unit 42 IOC table for coverage.SRC-UNIT42-ASHTAG-2025

Hashes and IOCs on this page are source pointers or representative public indicators. They SHOULD be refreshed from the linked source before operational use and MUST NOT be used alone for actor attribution.

Defensive Hunting Notes

ActorHunting Notes
WIRTEHunt DLL side-loading of dwampi.dll, wtsapi32.dll, srvcli.dll, or netutils.dll from unexpected paths, HTML-staged payload retrieval, AES/XOR decoding artifacts, modular C2, and Rclone execution after collection.

Handling Notes

ActorHandling Notes
WIRTENo samples; source-linked behavior only.

Mapped ATT&CK Techniques For Associated Actor(s)

ActorTechniqueTacticMapping QualitySource
WIRTET1566 PhishingInitial AccessM2SRC-CP-WIRTE-2024
WIRTET1574.001 DLL Search Order HijackingDefense EvasionM3SRC-CP-WIRTE-2024
WIRTET1485 Data DestructionImpactM2SRC-CP-WIRTE-2024
WIRTET1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand and ControlM3SRC-UNIT42-ASHTAG-2025
WIRTET1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltrationM3SRC-UNIT42-ASHTAG-2025

These detections are mapped through the associated actor or scenario and are not automatically tool-specific. Promote a tool-specific detection only after the behavior is tied to telemetry and test evidence.

ActorDetectionRelease StatusDRLRule
WIRTEDET-001 - Intune Bulk Device Wipe AnomalyHunt5detections/kql/intune-bulk-device-wipe-anomaly.kql
WIRTEDET-004 - Mail Click To Execution CorrelationHunt4detections/kql/mail-click-to-exec-correlation.kql

These hunts are mapped through the associated actor or scenario and may need narrowing before they are used for this specific tool.

ActorHuntHypothesisQuery
WIRTEHUNT-001If identity-plane destructive tradecraft is attempted then privileged role activation or bulk device actions will appear in audit logsdetections/kql/intune-bulk-device-wipe-anomaly.kql
WIRTEHUNT-004If VIP phishing is active then mail click events will correlate to risky sign-in or executiondetections/kql/mail-click-to-exec-correlation.kql

Source Review

SourcePublisherDateReliabilityTypeLast Reviewed
SRC-UNIT42-ASHTAG-2025Unit 422025-12-11AVendor CTI2026-05-14

If a source publishes a large or frequently changing IOC appendix, keep the current IOC list in the source system or TIP and store only the pointer here.