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Limitations

This page documents the known limitations of the detection engineering pipeline, lab validation, and coverage claims. Limitations are documented, not hidden.

Lab Validation Scope​

Lab simulations validate that the detection stack captures the right telemetry events for each simulated behavior. They do not prove:

  • That detection rules are evasion-proof against real attacker tooling
  • That the behavior observed matches what the actor does in live operations
  • That the benign simulation payloads are equivalent to actor-specific malware
  • That rules will not generate false positives in your specific environment

Real attacker tools include obfuscation, timing variation, LOLBin chaining, and environment-specific behavior not replicated in these simulations.

Known Validation Failures​

det_mw_0004 — DLL Side-Loading (PARTIAL)​

Root cause: The lab simulates DLL side-loading using a 4-byte MZ stub. The Windows loader rejects this before generating a Sysmon EID 7 event. The detection rule and Sysmon configuration are correct.

Fix path: Use a real compiled DLL (e.g., install Google Chrome to provide a genuine Goopdate.dll) or compile a minimal valid DLL with the correct export table. Coverage score: 3.

det_mw_0008a — Telegram Bot API C2 (FAIL)​

Root cause: VirtualBox NAT translates outbound connections. Sysmon EID 3 captures a connection to 10.0.2.2:443 (the NAT gateway), not api.telegram.org:443. The detection rule is correct.

Fix path: Configure the VM with a host-only or bridged NIC with direct internet access, or use a network proxy that preserves the destination hostname. Coverage score: 3.

Source Limitations​

  • All 8 promoted sources are public — no classified, restricted, or paid-subscription sources were used.
  • Government advisories (CISA AA22-055A, INCD 2023, INCD 2024) describe actor behavior at a campaign level; individual technique claims reflect analyst interpretation of published language.
  • Evidence labels (Observed / Reported / Assessed) reflect the analyst's reading of source language, not independent verification.

ATT&CK Mapping Limitations​

All ATT&CK technique mappings are analyst candidates. They reflect the most likely mapping given the available evidence — not confirmed actor behavior:

  • Technique mappings reflect public source claims filtered through analyst judgment
  • Mappings do not constitute attribution evidence — shared technique use does not identify an actor
  • Multiple techniques may describe the same behavior at different abstraction levels

Coverage Gap Acknowledgment​

  • 8 ATT&CK techniques have zero detection coverage (see Coverage Matrix)
  • 3 detections have coverage score 3 (validation incomplete or failed — documented reason in each)
  • 1 procedure technique (T1534 Internal Spearphishing) has no detection written — requires compromised-account telemetry outside the lab scope
  • The coverage matrix is a floor, not a ceiling

Capability Gates​

Detection coverage depends on telemetry that may not exist in every environment:

GateWithout It
PowerShell Script Block Logging (EID 4104)det_mw_0003 Rule B and det_mw_0009 Rules A/C degrade to command-line heuristics
Sysmon EID 10 (ProcessAccess)det_mw_0010 Rule A falls back to binary name matching; custom dumpers invisible
Sysmon EID 7 (ImageLoad)det_mw_0004 (DLL side-loading) invisible
DNS resolver logging (full QNAME)det_mw_0008b (DNS tunneling) invisible
Network flow / proxy logsdet_mw_0007 Rule C and det_mw_0008a network coverage lost
Email gateway telemetry (SEG)det_mw_0001 correlated logic unavailable

What This Project Is Not​

  • Not a threat attribution report — it does not claim to independently verify actor identity
  • Not an incident response playbook — simulations use benign payloads, not real actor tools
  • Not a red-team exercise — the lab validates detection telemetry capture, not attacker tradecraft
  • Not a production-ready detection rule set — rules require baseline tuning before deployment