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Detection Readiness Levels

Purpose

Define a practical DRL model so CTI-derived detections are not marketed as production coverage before validation.

Core Rule

Only DRL-9 can be called production detection coverage. Anything below DRL-9 is research, candidate logic, hunt content, pilot content, or validation work.

DRL Scale

DRLMeaningRequired Evidence
0Idea onlyBehavior or threat question exists; no evidence package.
1Source-backed candidateSource claim, evidence label, source reliability, and information credibility recorded.
2Observable definedObservable, expected malicious pattern, and expected benign overlap documented.
3Telemetry mappedData source, field names, retention, and owner identified.
4Hunt logic draftedQuery or analytic logic exists; no test evidence yet.
5Synthetic validationPositive and negative synthetic tests pass; limitations documented.
6Benign baseline reviewedExpected false positives reviewed against benign or lab-realistic data.
7Historical replay completeQuery replayed over historical data; alert volume and false-positive classes measured.
8SOC pilot completeSOC triage playbook, owner, escalation path, rollback plan, and pilot feedback complete.
9Production coverageApproved, monitored, reviewed, owned, tested, tuned, and rollback-ready.

DRL Scale: Detection Readiness Levels 0–9

Required Validation Artifacts

ArtifactRequired ByNotes
Source claim and evidence IDDRL-1Must include evidence label and confidence reason.
Field mappingDRL-3Include platform-specific fields, not only generic telemetry names.
Positive testDRL-5Demonstrates expected malicious pattern fires.
Negative testDRL-5Demonstrates obvious benign control does not fire.
Benign baseline replayDRL-6Measures known normal behavior.
Historical replayDRL-7Measures volume over realistic retention window.
False-positive analysisDRL-7Must include classes and tuning guidance.
SOC triage playbookDRL-8First checks, required logs, escalation, and response authority.
Rollback planDRL-8How to disable or tune if alert causes harm.
Owner and review dateDRL-8Named team/person and next review date.
Production approvalDRL-9Change record and acceptance of residual risk.

Required Validation Artifacts for DRL Promotion

Examples

DRLExample
0"Maybe detect RMM abuse."
1Vendor report describes RMM abuse; source and evidence row created.
2Observable: new RMM install on non-IT host followed by external session.
3EDR software inventory, process, network, and identity fields confirmed.
4KQL/SPL/Sigma logic drafted.
5Synthetic positive RMM install fires; benign approved install does not.
6Baseline shows approved helpdesk tooling generates expected benign matches.
730-day replay produces manageable alert volume and known false-positive classes.
8SOC pilot runbook tested by analysts; rollback owner assigned.
9Production alert approved, monitored, reviewed, and tied to response process.

DRL Scale Example: RMM Abuse Detection Journey

Bad Example / Corrected Example

Bad:

The rule is mapped to ATT&CK, so production coverage exists.

Corrected:

The rule is DRL-4. It has behavior-backed ATT&CK mapping and draft logic, but no positive test, negative test, benign baseline, historical replay, SOC pilot, or production approval.

DRL Promotion Checklist

Full SOC Handoff Example

Handoff ID: SOC-RMM-001
Detection: New RMM installation on non-IT host followed by external remote session
DRL: 8 during pilot
Why it matters: Source-backed adversary behavior overlaps with unauthorized remote control.
First checks:
- Confirm host owner and business role.
- Check software approval and change ticket.
- Review parent process and install source.
- Review identity session, source IP, MFA state, and remote session destination.
- Check email/web activity in the preceding 24 hours.
Required logs: EDR process, software inventory, network, identity, helpdesk ticketing.
False positives: Helpdesk deployment, vendor support, IT migration, approved remote work.
Escalation threshold: No ticket plus unknown source plus external remote session plus suspicious pre-install activity.
Response: Follow IR policy; do not isolate critical systems without incident commander approval.
Rollback: Disable alert or add approved deployment group if false-positive rate exceeds pilot threshold.
Owner: Detection Engineering
Review date: 2026-06-16

References